STATEMENT BY LEADERS OF 81 COMMUNIST PARTIES:

AN ANALYSIS

(By Central Research Department, Radio Liberty, Munich)

Like its predecessor in 1957, the declaration is a militant document. It lays down both a strategic plan and tactical blueprint for the ultimate worldwide defeat of capitalism. Under these circumstances it may be irrelevant to ask whether Moscow or Peking has "won" at the Moscow Summit. Khrushchev seems to have gotten all his major points accepted, but significantly there is no overt approval of Khrushchev's policy of summity and nothing that even smacks of a resumption of "Camp David" type of diplomacy.

The foreign policy of socialist countries is said to be the policy of "peaceful coexistence and economic competition." But the important matter of tone and emphasis is well illustrated by the nutshell definition of peaceful coexistence given by the new declaration: "...is a policy of mobilizing the masses and launching vigorous action against the enemies of peace and for disarmament." If Peking has been persuaded to continue endorsing peaceful coexistence, Khrushchev has had to put more teeth into the definition of that policy. For example, "peaceful coexistence does not mean an armistice of the socialist and bourgeois ideologies. On the contrary, it presupposes intensification of the struggle of the working class and all Communist Parties for the triumph of socialist ideas."

The document makes it clear that a massive new propaganda drive for disarmament is to be expected, and the Soviet proposal for general and complete disarmament is hailed. It is made clear by the context that this is viewed less as a renewed diplomatic offensive than as a new tactic of "mobilizing the masses" so as "to force the imperialists into an agreement on general disarmament". For this purpose it is even proposed that "in many capitalist countries the split in the working class movement might be healed."

As expected, the document endorses the notion that "was not fatally inevitable." The reason cited is the rather unconvincing argument that the socialist and peace camp is so strong that imperialists no longer have the initiative to conduct either a general or local war. This seems to be a point on which the Chinese definitely acquiesced to the Soviet view because it goes on to say, "Prevention of global thermonuclear disaster is a primary task," and, "Democratic and peace forces have no more pressing task."

This is followed by the argument that it would be too late to struggle for disarmament or against war after "atom and hydrogen bombs begin to fall."

West German militarism is a prime target of the document and the East German puppet regime (GDR) is said to have a "very special role" in the struggle (more)
against it. The "whole socialist camp has the duty to safeguard the GDR." While this formulation is not entirely new, its reaffirmation would seem to foreshadow an adamant position for the long future on the German question and little elbow room for Khrushchev to propose or entertain novel approaches.

At least one new major political term has been introduced into the Communist lexicon by the declaration. It is the concept of states which can be labeled "national democracies" but are definitely anti-imperialist. In short, they are "neutralist" countries by another name, but special kinds of neutrals in which ideal conditions exist for the local Communist Party to work for the socialist revolution. A national democracy is defined as "a state which consistently upholds political and economic independence, fights imperialism and the latter's military alignment, and opposes bases on its own territory; a state that resists new forms of colonialism and the infiltration of imperialist capital; rejects dictatorial and despotic methods of government; a state in which the people are insured broad and democratic rights and freedoms." This new formula is loose enough to be applied to a great many currently neutralist states (such as India, Indonesia, etc.), but it also is obscure enough to leave unclear for whom it really is intended. For example, South Vietnam and Laos are listed as struggling for national democracy.

One must conclude that the document utterly fails to provide any clear-cut new formulations which could be used as touchstones in resolving differing "estimates and conclusions" in Moscow and Peking about the political situation in any specific country--such as Algeria, Cuba, Congo, Latin American or Asian countries, etc. In fact, some crucial points are clothed in such general terms that they could be taken as a formalized version of the disagreement already existing between Moscow and Peking on tactics in various countries. For example, the vital doctrinal question of the role of the national bourgeoisie in colonial and dependent countries is left in flexible limbo: "An important force in winning national liberation...is the alliance of working class and peasantry...The strength and stability of this alliance will determine to no small degree the extent to which the national bourgeoisie participates in the struggle for liberation."

The treatment of revisionism-dogmatism is a special topic on which preliminary research indicates a major triumph for Moscow over Peking. But one paragraph indicates that only "jointly decided estimates and conclusions" at international Communist gatherings "demand the adherence" of every Communist Party. This leaves room for interpretation. Does it foreshadow the eventual establishment of a new agency for "joint" decision of Communist world policy, a new Comintern? While it obviously represents a pledge by Peking that it will not stab Khrushchev in the back in his international diplomacy, does it not by the same token impose obligations on Khrushchev which will limit his flexibility in world tactics and timing--a limitation which presumably caused him to face up to the Chinese disagreement in the first place?

(more)
In short, the new declaration paints a deceptively monolithic picture of Communist goals and interpretations, which are widely at variance with the degree of basic divergence of views known to exist; at variance also with the acrimony and the long deliberation involved in the Moscow Summit meeting. One is well advised to probe long and deeply into the substance of this mantle of unity. And on the other hand, skepticism should not let one rule out the realistic possibility that a workable truce has been achieved, which may lay to rest the Sino-Soviet dispute for a certain period during which a more or less coordinated pattern of Communist challenge is presented to the free world. In either case, the Moscow declaration of 1960 is a historic document deserving of the most intense scrutiny and analysis—both for what it says and what it leaves half-said.